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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
of DAVIDE. ROSS, No. 16816 
Deceased .. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a proceeding initiated by the personal representative 
of the decedent David E. Ross for a judicial determination as to 
whether certain shares of corporate stock owned by the decedent 
should be distributed as part of the estate, or whether such 
shares had been previously given to one of the heirs by the 
decedent prior to his deathQ 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On August 24, 1979, a full evidentiary hearing was held 
before the Honorable David E. Dee, at which time the c·laimant 
donee offered evidence in an attempt to prove that certain 
shares of stock passed to him by inter vivos gifts. A claim 
disputed by the remaining heirs. On October 19, 1979, the 
lower court issued its Memorandum Decision in favor of Earl 
Roderick Ross and held that an inter vivos gift of stock had 
been made prior to the decedent's death. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants David E. Ross II and Betsy Louise Ross Rapps 
(the only other heirs of the decedent) seek reversal of the 
trial court's judgment and an order of this Court that the 
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stock now in controversy should be included in the estate of 
the decedent to be divided equally among the three heirs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on November 9, 1979, the lower court executed its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the attorney for 
Earl Roderick Ross. (R., pp. 110-121) • Subsequently, appellants 
filed a "Motion to Alter and Amend the Decree, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law." (R .. , pp .. 128-129). Appellants 
submitted "Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" 
for the consideration of the Court. (R., pp. 146-155). The 
trial court denied the appellants' motion and ratified the 
previous Findings of Fact filed with the clerk.. (R., pp. 
144-145). 
Appellants maintained in the lower court that the Findings 
en te.red by the lower court were erroneous in two respects. 
First, that certain legal conclusions were made in the "Find-
ings of Fact" and second, that material facts were omitted 
from t:he Findings. (TR., pp. 453-464}. The lower court rejected 
these arguments. {TR., pp. 465-466). In any event, however, 
a comparison of the proposed Findings submitted by appellants 
and the actual Findings filed with the clerk show minimal 
differences. While appellants contend that certain critical 
findings were omitted by the trial court, appellants have 
little dispute as to the actual Findings entered by the trial 
court and would agree, for purposes of this appeal, that the 
facts as found are basically undisputed. 
Since the Argument portion of this brief will concern 
-2 
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itself with specific findings and conclusions of the trial 
court, there would be no purpose served in extensive repetition 
of the facts at this point.. Howev~r, a brief overview of the 
facts should be helpful to this Court in understanding the 
position of the parties. References to the transcript will 
be omitted as to all undisputed facts and will only be included 
as to facts in dispute or as to facts omitted in the Findings 
of the trial court. 
The decedent David E. Ross was the secretary and treasurer 
of Equitable Life Insurance Company for many years, and served 
a,s a director and stock transfer agent of the company. (Tr .. , 
p. 176). The respondent Earl Roderick Ross (hereinafter 
referred to as "Rod Ross") is a son of the decedent. Appellant 
David Ross II is also a son of the decedent and is the brother 
of Rod. Appellant Betsy Ross Rapps (hereinafter referred to 
as "Betsy Rapps~'J is a daughter of the decedent and is the 
sister of Rod and David. 
The decedent was also secretary and treasurer and stock 
transfer agent of four other corporations known as Ross 
Brothers Corporation, Equitable Investment Company, Insurance 
Investment-Company, and National Housing and Finance Company. 
(Tr. , p. 177) .. 
Appellant Betsy Rapps resides in Fairfax, Virginia, and 
has lived there for six years. (Tr .. , p. 373). Appellant 
David Ross II lives in St. Charles, Illinois (Tr., p. 313). 
Respondent Rod Ross previously lived in the eastern United 
States but returned to Salt Lake in 1972 and has lived here 
-3-
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since that time. (Tr . , pp • 2 6 7 - 2 6 9 ) • 
In 1972 Rod Ross began working for Equitable Life Insu-
rance Company and saw his father on an occasional basis at 
the company. Rod continued to work for the company and 
is presently the new secretary-treasurer. (Tr . , p • 2 6 8} • 
It is basically undisputed that between 1974 and 1978 
the decedent discussed with several persons his desire to 
reward Rod for his efforts in the company by giving him stock 
in addition to that which would be distributed to him under 
the decedent" s will.. (P .• , p. 117). The majority of these 
conversations adduced at trial concerned a future intent to 
give additional unnamed stock to Rod. (E • g. Tr. , pp . 2 0 3 , 
218, 297-298, 301}. In other conversations, the decedent 
purportedly mentioned specific gifts which he intended on 
making, or which he had already made. (Tr., pp. 206, 310J. 
Although the decedent•· s intent as expressed to several 
witnesses is basically undisputed as to his desire to reward 
Rod, it is equally undisputed that he was deeply concerned 
about the problems that would develop with his other children 
by the gift of any additional shares. (Tr., pp. 204, 207, 261). 
Even Rod Ross recognized this problem and said that he did 
not want to be a party to any decision giving him extra stock 
since it would only cause problems with Betsy and Dave. (T.r .. , p,. 2( 
Prior to May of 1977 the decedent maintained a safety 
deposit box at First Security Bank and kept all family stock 
certificates in that box. The decedent maintained the stock 
for the entire Ross family which included his own family, 
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the family of his brother Galen, and the family of his 
deceased brother Ray. Each family member had his or her 
own envelope in which various stock certificates were 
placed by the decedent. (Tre, PP~ 179, 185}. 
In November of 1974 the decedent cancelled a- stock 
certificate which he owned in Equitable Life and Casualty 
Insurance Company and issued a new certificate in the 
name of Earl Roderick Ross for 2,210.70 shares. He reissued 
a new certificate to himself for the surplus shares 
which were not given to Rod. A stock ledger sheet of Equitable 
was prepared by the decedent and reflected the issuance of 
shares to Rod and the cancellation of the decedent's shares. 
The certificate was placed in an envelope which had the name 
of Earl Roderick Ross ~Tritten upon it and was dated !lovember 29, 
1974. The decedent placed the envelope in the First Security 
safety deposit box. None of the decedent's heirs had access 
to this box. 
On December 2, 1974, a stock dividend was declared by 
Equitable Life and Casualty Company and an additional 552.67 
shares were issued by the company to Earl Roderick Ross~ 
The actual paper transaction was again accomplished by the 
decedent, who was secretary and treasurer of the corporation, 
and he again placed the new stock certificate in a second 
envelope noting the name of Earl Roderick Ross and dating 
it December 2, 1974. This envelope also was placed in the 
safe deposit box. 
On November 30, 1976, and on May 3, 1977, two stock 
-5-
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dividends were paid directly by Equitable Life and Casualty 
to Earl Roderick Ross, each amount being $276.33. 
In May of 1977 the decedent's brother Ray died. At 
that time the d~cedent and his surviving brother Galen 
transferred the contents of the First Security safety 
deposit box to the company safe of Equitable Casualty. 
(Tr., pp. 178-179). This safe, which contained all of the 
family stock certificates, was located in a small room adjoin-
ing the decedent's office_ Only the decedent, the president, 
and the vice-president of the company had the safe's combi-
nation. 
Rod Ross attended stockholder meetings of Equitable 
Life Insurance Company and the other corporations managed 
by his father even before any purported gift of stock had 
been made to him. (Tr. 2 7 4) . On December 5, 1977, an organiza-
tional meeting was held for Ross Brothers Corporation. The 
corporation was formed in order to distribute the assets of a 
former partnership owned by the three Ross brothers. At 
the meeting Galen Ross issued new stock ce·rtificates and 
handed them to each recipient" Rod was handed a certificate 
of 250 shares which represented- 25 percent of his .. _fath~r=' s 
alloted shares. After examining the certificate Rod handed 
it to his father. The decedent subsequently placed it 
into the safe with the other family certificates. 
In February of 1978 several stock transactions occurred 
in which stock certificates were issued in the name of Earl 
Roderick Ross for the Equitable Investment Company, the 
Insurance Investment Company, and the National Housing and 
-6 
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Finance Syndicate Corporation. These transactions are outlined 
in the Findings of the Courto (Tr., pp. 114-116). A separate 
stock ledger sheet was created on the records of the Insurance 
Investment Company under the name of Earl Roderick Ross but 
no ledger entries were made for the transfers as to the other 
two companies since ledger sheets wer~ not maintained$ 
The certificates as to these three companies were placed 
in a single envelope with the name of Rod Ross and the certi-
ficate numbers written upon ito This envelope was then placed 
in the safe in the office of the decedent. 
A will was prepared by the decedent's·brother Galen on 
February 17, 1978, which divided the decedent's estate equally 
among the three surviving children. Mro Ross, upon cross-
examination, identified four exhibits which were in his hand-
writing and which noted the number of purported shares trans-
ferred by the decedent to Rod Ross as to each companyo Mr. 
Ross :stated that these were notes that the witness had made 
for provisions to be placed in the decedent's will but that 
these specific clauses were never actually put into the will. 
(Tr., pp. 265-266). Thus, the will made no mention of any 
prior gifts having been made to Rod. 
It is also undisputed, although not contained in the 
Court's Findings, that no tax returns were ever filed by 
the decedent with respect to any of the alleged gifts (Tr., 
p. 240) , that respondent Rod Ross had no access to either 
the safety deposit box or the safe, that after his father's 
death he was not aware where any of the certificates were 
located (Tr.,. p. 277), and that Rod did not see the envelopes 
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containing the stock until after his father~s death. 
(Tro / p .. 272). 
Numerous other facts were raised at the hearing. These 
facts concerned the credibility of the witnesses, the 
·sequence.of events, the knowledge of the respondent as to 
the gifts, and the conversations among the parties regarding 
the gifts after the decedentrs death. 
The case was submitted to the trial court after extensive 
briefing by both parties. A Memorandum Decision was made by 
the lower court on October 19, 1979. The court concluded 
that a valid gift had been made by the decedent to Rod Ross 
prior to the decedent's death. A Judgment and Decree and 
accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
subsequently executed by the trial court.· (R., p. 107-120). 
It is from this judgment that the present appeal is 
taken. (R., p. 137}. 
ARGUMENT 
EVEN ASSUMING THE FACTS AS FOUND BY·THE LOWER 
COURT TO BE CORRECT, THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BY MISAPPLYING THE LAW TO THESE FACTS AND 
CONCLUDING THAT A VALID GIFT HAD BEEN MADE., 
Appellants David Ross II and Betsy Rapps maintain that the 
lower court committed prejudicial error in determining that a 
valid gift had been made of the various stock when the facts 
as found by the trial .court failed to show that essential 
elements of a valid gift were present. Thus, appellants do 
not dispute the evidence supporting the court's findings, but 
do dispute the conclusions reached from these findings. This 
contention was expressed in Elton v. Utah State Retirement 
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Board, 503 P.2d 137 (Utah 1972) as follows: 
A trial court's findings will not be disturbed 
unless clearly against the weight of evidence 
or unless it manifestly appears that the 
court has misapplied the law to the established 
facts.. Id. at 138 (Emphasis added). 
A review of the rules applicable to gift cases is necessary in 
order to understand the arguments now advanced by these appellants. 
A. BURDEN OF PROOF 
This Court has repeatedly held that one who claims title 
to property by inter vivos gift has the burden of proving all 
of the elements of such gifts by clea·r and convincing evidence .. 
The law in Utah in this regard is consistent with the over-
whelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions.. This 
standard has been stated as follows: 
There is· no presumption in favor of a gift 
inter vivos.. One who asserts title by 
gift inter vivos has the burden of proving 
that a gift was made, including the exis-
tence of all of the elements essential to 
its validity ... o Courts watch gifts 
inter vivos with caution, especially where, 
as here, their enforcement would result 
in an inequitable distribution of decedent's 
property. Jones v .. Cook, 223 P.2d 423, 425 
(Utah 1950). 
The standard of proof required in gift cases is higher than the 
normal civil case. Rather than the "preponderance of evidence" 
test, courts require that the evidence must be "clear and 
convincing." As stated by this Court: 
We are quite in accord with the proposition 
of law advocated by the plaintiff; That the 
initial burden as to the prima facie proof 
of a gift, and also the burden of ultimate 
persuasion in the case, rests upon the 
defendant as to the claiming doneeQ We 
further agree with the general rule that 
one so claiming a gift from another must 
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so demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence; and this is especially so when 
the claimed donor is deceased. Sims v. 
George, 446 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1970). 
(Emphasis added) . 
The standard of "clear and convincing" proof has likewi~ 
been defined by this Court as follows: 
For a matter to be clear and convincing to 
a particular mind it must at least have 
reached the point where there remains no 
serious or substantial doubt as to the 
correctness of the conclusion. A mind 
which was of the opinion that it was con-
vinced and yet which entertained, not 
a slight, but a reasonable doubt as to the 
correctness of its conclusion, would seem 
to be in a state of confusion. Greener v. 
Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 205 {Utah 1949). 
Similarly, this Court in Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust 
Company, 286 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1955), stated that clear and 
convincing proof approaches that degree of proof required 
in a criminal case viz, "beyond a ·reasonable doubt." 
The reason for requiring this high standard of proof is 
obvious. Once a person has died.there is no way for the 
decedent to refute the claims of the living that gifts were 
made prior to death. Unless a high standard of proof is 
maintained the estate of a decedent could be virtually 
wiped out by claims of inter vivos gifts. This principle 
was again stated by this Court when it said: 
While it is the duty of courts to enforce 
the intention of the owner, it is also 
their duty to protect his estate against 
all claims unless established in conformity 
to law. Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, 
124 P. 765, 768 {Utah 1912). 
-10-
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As will be seen from the following discussion, the trial 
court failed to apply this standard to the facts of this 
B. ELEMENTS OF AN INTER VIVOS GIFTe 
In order for a person to successfully claim title to 
property by inter vivos gift, he must first prove by clear 
and convincing evidence each of the following elements: 
(1) A clear and unmistakable intention on 
the part of the donor to pass immediate owner-
ship. Jones v. Cook, ~23 P.2d 423 (Utah 1950); 
Lovett v. Continental Bank and Trust Company, 
286 P.2d 10E5 (Utah 1955). 
(2) An irrevocable delivery. Wiggill v. 
Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979); Lovett v. 
Continental Bank and Trust Company, 286 P.2d 1066 
(Utah 1955); Losee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132 
(Utah 1951) . 
(3) Acceptance. Simms v. George, 446 P.2d 
831 (Utah 1970) . 
Appellants disputed each of these necessary elements in the 
lower court. Evidence was presented, for example, tha~ while. 
the decedent often expressed an intention to give Rod addi-
tional stock, this intention was phrased in terms of the future 
and that the decedent hesitated.in actually completing the 
gift because of the disharmony which would occur to the family 
unit once the gift was made. Likewise, appellants disputed 
the acceptance of the gift by Rod on the basis that he was 
completely unaware of what stock had been given to him, if 
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any, and was as curious to see the purported gift as were 
the other heirs. 
Of course, Rod Ross put on evidence contrary to that of 
appellantsand the trial court chose to believe his version of 
the evidence regarding intent and acceptance. Upon review of 
this record appellants have concluded that this Court could 
find substantial evidence to support the lower court's 
conclusion of intent and acceptance, and therefore do not appeal 
from these findings. 
The element of "irrevocable delivery," however, does 
require reversal. As will be shown infra, even if it is 
assumed that the trial court believed all of the facts in 
support of delivery as produced by Rod~Ross at the trial, 
this evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to justify 
a finding of irrevocable delivery. 
C. FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT REGARDING DELIVERY. 
After hearing evidence presented by both parties the Court 
issued its own Memorandum Decision on October 19, 1979. This 
decision, together with the Findings subsequently entered, 
show the basis for the Court's judgment that delivery had been 
performed. The Memorandum Decision s:tated, in part, the 
following: 
The Court finds that there was a clear and 
unmistakable intention on the part of the 
deceased to pass immediate ownership to E. 
Roderick Ross and that there was an irre-
vocable delivery to him and an acceptance by 
him of the stock. certificates here in 
question. 
In arriving at this decision the Court is 
cognizant of the part played by stock 
record books which, in this case, clearly 
-L. 
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indicated a transfer on these books and records 
to E. Roderick Ross and an actual issuance of 
certificates requiring the signature of both 
the deceased and Galen Ross to effectuate 
the intent of the donorc Had the certificates 
in fact not been placed in an envelope in a safe 
or desk drawer of David E. Ross, which seemed 
to be his custom in regards to all certificates 
of stock, but in fact the certificate became lost, 
then the only source of information as to owner-
ship would have been the corporate stock transfer 
records and by entry on these records a clear and 
unmistakable contention for immediate ownership 
transfer is recorded. These records also indicate 
an irrevocable delivery and an acceptance . . . 
The stock record books give a basis for determina-
tion of voting power, dividend recipients, and 
persons to whom corporate information such as 
proxy, notice of meetings, etc~, must be furnished 
and are the most clear and convincing evidence as 
to the actual owners of a corporation. (R., p. 
106) . 
On November 9, 1979, the lower court executed its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Viewing these Findings most 
favorably to Respondent Rod Ross with reference to the require-
ment of irrevocable delivery reveals the following: 
(a) A November 1974 transaction in which Rod 
Ross received 2,210.7 shares of Equitable Life and 
Casualty common stock was received in the stock 
ledger book of the company by the decedent. (R., 
p. 112) . 
(b} A stock dividend of 552 shares of 
Equitable Life and Casualty was distributed in 
the name of Earl Roderick Ross. 
(c) The respondent received two cash dividends 
in the amount of $276.33 on May 3, 1977, and 
November 30, 1976. 
(d) On December 5, 1977, a certificate for 
250 shares of Ross Brothers stock was physically 
handed to Respondent by his uncle Galen Rossw 
Respondent then handed this certificate to his 
father, David E. Ross. 
-13-
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(e) On February 17, 1978, additional stock 
was issued to Respondent in Equitable Investment 
Company, Insurance Investment Company, and 
National Housing and Finance Syndicate Corpora-
tion. All of these transfers were recorded on the 
books and records of the respective corporations 
and, in addition, a separate stock ledger sheet was 
created in the Insurance Investment Company under 
the name of Respondent Rod RossG 
(f) All of the preceding certificates were 
placed in envelopes with the name of Respondent 
Earl Roderick Ross upon them and with notations 
made by the decedent as to the various certificate 
numbers and number of shares. 
(g) These stock certificates were kept along 
with all family stock certificates, both owned and 
not owned by the decedent, and were kept in either 
the First Security safety deposit box or the safe 
of Equitable Life Insurance Company. (R., pp. 
110-119) • 
The trial court enumerated the basis for its conclusion of 
law that a delivery of the certificates had taken place by 
stating the following: 
[O]n each of the gifts, there was clear 
and convincing evidence of a voluntary 
transfer of possession sufficient to show 
delivery of each of the certificates, such 
delivery being demonstrated by: 
(a} A complete transfer on the 
books and records of the corporation 
for each of the shares in question; and 
(b) By the placing of each of the 
shares in a properly identified envelope 
to be kept with and maintained with the 
certificates belonging to each of the 
members of the Ross family; and 
(c) The c.omplete lack of any effort 
by the decedent ·to revoke, to set conditions 
on or otherwise exercise any prerequisite 
of ownership in any of the shares in 
question. (R., pp. 119-120}. 
-14-
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As will be seen infra, these findings made by the lower 
court and the reasoning used by the court in its Memorandum 
Decision are contrary to Utah law and therefore the conclusions 
and judgment are erroneous. 
O. PURPOSE OF REQUIRING ACTUAL DELIVERY OF STOCK. 
The requirement of actual irrevocable delivery is not a 
mere formality with no substance. The obvious purpose of 
this requirement is to insure that a person who purportedly 
gives away property for either altruistic or tax reasons has 
actually done so and that the gift is not a sham for the 
purpose of giving the donor an advantage without suffering 
any detriment. The policy reasons behind this requirement 
have been stated in the following article relating to the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act which was formerly law of Utah. 
This article states the following: 
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act which is statu-
tory • . . required delivery of a properly endorsed 
certificate, either in blank or to a specified 
person, this is clear and simple. Nevertheless, 
many alleged gifts of corporate stock have 
been h~ld invalid by the courts because there 
was no delivery or no endorsement in compliance 
with the express provisions of the Act. Often, 
· this is the result of negligence, but ~ 
frequently is brought about by various altruistic 
plans of the donor or by "hedging" on the 
unequivocal requisites· of the Act. The donor 
thinks it is easy to give stock away, and also 
retain dominion over it at the same time. 
An attorney advises his client of the advantages 
of a direct transfer to the beneficiaries through 
the medium of a- gift inter vivos and the client 
agrees; but still he hesitates to give up the . 
stock irrevocably. He therefore emEloys ·a variety 
of hedging arrangements, He ma¥ er:idorse ·the 
certificate in blank and place it in a safety 
deposit box to which he and the donee have 
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acc:ess, or· he may have a new certificate 
issued in the donee's name and keep it in 
his own desk. His intention, in either 
case, is to retain dominion over the shares 
until his death or some indefinite future 
timeo He is actually attempting to make a 
conditional gift inter vivas but there is 
no such thing. Lo Modesitt, "Application of 
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to Gifts of 
Stock," 20 Rocky Mountain L .. Rev. 67 (Emphasis 
added). 
In the instant case it_is only conjecture whether the 
decedent wished to transfer all of these shares of stock to 
Rod at the time the certificates were placed into the safe 
or whether, because of fear of family disunity or speculation 
that Rod would leave the company, the decedent wished to 
retain control over the stock until such time as he felt 
actual delivery to be appropriate. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the decedent actually 
intended on transferring the stock at the time the certif i~ 
cates were made, this intention is not sufficient without 
delivery. As stated by this Court in Singleton v. Kelly, 
212 P .. 63, 66 (Utah 1922): 
While. it is true that the courts will carry 
out the grantor's intention wcenever this 
is possible, without any evidence of 
delivery it can be of no importance what-
ever what the·. 1.intentions :. i.of the grantor in 
this· case were. One may have an intention 
to convey his porperty to another, but 
unless the deed is delivered to the grantee 
or someone for him, title cannot pass, and 
the undelivered deed is a nullity. 
Thus, appellants contend as their sole issue that the 
evidence as found by the trial court most favorably to Respondent 
Rod Ross does not support the conclusion that a valid delivery 
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with the question of what is required in making the gift 
of corporate stock. 
E. DIVERGENT REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSFER OF STOCK. 
The determination of whether a gift of stock is complete 
or not rests upon whether an irrevocable transfer of the stock 
has been deemed to have occurred. The p~rpose of the delivery 
requirement is to eliminate the donor's dominion and control 
over the stock. 
There is a split of authority among the various states as 
to what steps must be taken before the transfer is complete. 
A small minority of states hold that as soon as a transfer has 
been recorded on the books of the corporation that the control 
of the stock is lost by the donor and the gift has become 
irrevocable regardless of whether the donor keeps the stock 
certificate in his possession. The vast majority of states, 
including Utah, accept a contrary view to the effect that 
transferring stock on corporate books does not take the stock 
beyond the donor's control unless the stock certificate is 
physically delivered to the donee. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in F5gures v. Sherrell, 
178 s.w. 2d 629 (Tenn. 1944) extensively discusses these 
differing philosophies adopted by the various statese The 
court noted that Pennsylvania, Illinois and Vermont had adopted 
the rule that the corporate records govern whether or not a 
transfer has occurred. These courts maintain that the best 
evidence of ownership is the transfer on the books of the 
company. These courts hold that stock certificates are 
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secondary evidence of ownership only and that they are 
nothing more than the official declaration by the company of 
what had already app~ared on the books~ 
The Tennessee court then stated that this Pennsylvania 
rule was not that of Tennessee and that· title to shares of 
stock, both legal and equitable, follow the lawful possession 
of the certificate. The court quoted with approval a prior 
Tennessee case which stated its stock transfer rule as follows: 
The title of the purchaser upon the assign-
ment of the certificate was complete without 
registration or transEer on the stock books 
of the corporation. The rule requiring 
transfer on the books of the company, 
by the well-settled line of decisions 
in this state, and by the great weight 
of authority in the courts of America, is 
a rule made solely for the benefit of the 
company. By it the company is enabled to 
know who are entitled to vote, and to whom 
it may pay dividends. Id. at 631. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court after extensively reviewing 
its prior decisions concluded as follows: 
It is clear, therefore, from our decisions 
that as between the parties thereto the 
completion of a sale or a gift cannot be made 
to depend upon entries on the books of a 
corporation where its shares of stock are 
involved. Title in this jurisdiction goes 
with the certificate. !d. at 632. (Emphasis 
added) , 
As will be discussed in the next subsection, Utah has 
adopted this same philosophy that title goes with the certificate 
and not with the corporate books. The basis of this doctrine was 
discussed by the New Jersey Court in Besson v. Stevens, 120 A. 
640 (N.J. 1921), where a gift of corporate stock was denied 
in the case ~here the donor had a certificate of stock reissued 
in the name of his daughter on . the corporate books but failed 
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to deliver the new certificate to his daughter during his 
lifetimec The court rejected the argument that a valid gift 
had been made and stated the following: 
Suppose the testator, after receiving the 
new certificate from the company, had 
changed his mind and decided that he wanted 
the stock for himself; that Elsie had 
demanded the certificate from him and 
he had refused to give it to hers There 
is no doubt in my mind that Elsie's 
claim of ownership, in whatever court or by 
whatever form of action asserted, would not 
be sustained. Id. at 646. 
The great weight of authority supports the Utah position 
that title does not pass with the mere change of ownership 
reflected on corporate books. A leading authority on corporations 
and trust agreements~ substantiates this .position by saying: 
The mere direction by the owner to the 
corporation to change the corporate records 
regarding ownership, followed by such 
change to the name of another, seems to be 
inadequate proof of a gift, when not followed 
by delivery of the new certificate.. The 
change of the corporate transfer books 
is not ordinarily necessary to a completed 
gift or conclusive evidence that a donation 
has occurred. 1 A Boggert, Trust and Trustees, 
§142, page 13. 
There are numerous states supporting this position, 
including Kentucky, Weisenberger v~ Corcoran, 121 s.w. 2d 712 
CKy. 19381 ; Maine, Reid v. Cromwell, 18 3 A. 7 5 8 (Me. 193 6) ; 
North Carolina, Buffalo v. Barnes, 38 S.E. 222 (N.C .. 1946); 
New York, In Re Schenk's Will, 140 N .. Y .. S. 2d 802 (N.Y.S.C .. 
1965); Oklahoma, Frazier v. Oklahoma Gas and E. Company, 
63 P.2d 11 (Okla. 1936); Texas, Baldwin v. Fleck, 168 S.W.2d 
904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943}; and Washington, In Re McCoy's Estate, 
63 P. 2d 522 (_Wash. 1937). 
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The supreme court of Minnesota in In Re Bush's Trust, 
81 NoW. 2d 615 (Minn. 1957), succinctly stated the reasons 
why these states (and Utah) required title to pass with the 
certificate and not with the co~p<>rate books. The court 
there stated: 
In view of the basic importance of the 
certificates as a badge of ownership 
and as a symbol of transfer of title 
between the parties, and further in view 
of the fact that the recording of a transfer 
of stocks on the corporate books by the 
great weight of authority is (in the absence 
of an express statute to the contrary) , for 
the benefit of the corporation, we reject 
the authorities which hold that a bare 
transfer of the stock on the corporate 
records, without a delivery to the trans-
feree _of _the:new cert..ificate, passes the 
legal and equitable title to the stock. Id. 
at 623 (_Emphasis added).. 
Thus, the overwhelming majority of states require an actual 
transfer and delivery of the stock certificate itself before a 
_ gift is deemed to have occurred. Utah is numbered among the 
Jl'\ajority- of states which have adopted this requirement. 
F. UTAH. _LAW OF STOCK TRANSFER 
Since the formation of Utah as a state it has always been 
the rule that stock transfers through the certificate and .:not 
through entries in corporate books. This historical development 
can be briefly traced by examining several Utah Supreme Court 
decisions, the prior Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and the 
present Uniform Commercial Code provisions, 
In 1912 this Court in Rasmussen v. Sevier Valley Canal 
Company, 121 P. 741 (Utah 1912) held that a stockholder may 
transfer his equitable title to shares of corporate stock by 
delivery of the certificate without complying with the by-laws 
-20- ~ 
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of the corporation for transferring shares even tho,~gh the 
certificate provides that the shares are transferable only 
on the surrender of the certificate and the by-laws of the 
corporation provide that no transfer of stock shall be valid 
except when entered on the corporate books. 
This Court in Brown Ve Wright, 161 Pp 448 (Utah 1916), 
noted that the Utah laws of 1907 provided that stock wouid be 
demeed personal property and that the delivery of the stock 
certificate creates the actual transfer of the title regardless 
of any corporate by-laws or requirements to the contraryo 
Finally, this Court in Gowans v. Rock Port Irrigation Company, 
293 P. 4 (Utah 1930) stated that as between parties, the delivery 
of the stock certificate is sufficient to transfer title to 
the purchaser. 
In 1927 Utah adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as 
subsequently found in Section 16-3-1, U.CaA. (1953) e This Act 
provided that title to a stock certificate and to the shares 
represented thereby could only be transferred "by delivery 
of the certificate endorsed either in blank or to a specified 
person by the person appearing by the certificate to be the 
owner.of the shares represented thereby&" The comments written 
by the Commissioners who drafted· the Uniform Stock Transfer 
Act stated the purpose of the Act as follows, 
The provisions of this Section are in accor-
dance with the existing law, except that the 
transfer of the certificate is here made to 
operate as a transfer of the shares, whereas 
at conunon law it is the registry on the 
books of the company which makes the com-
plete transfer. The reason for the change 
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is in order that the certificate may, to the 
fullest extent possible, be the representative 
of the shares. This is the fundamental 
purpose of the whole act, and is in accordance 
with the mercantile usage. 6 Uniform Laws 
Annotated, page 2. (Emphasis added) . 
Numerous state courts have held that under the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act it is only the transfer of the certificate 
itself which constitutes the delivery for purposes of deter-
mining gifts. See Shinsaku·Negano v. McGrath, 187 F.2d 753 
(7th Cir. 1951); Fonentot v. Drewniak, 181 So. 619 {L.A. App. 
1938); In Re Bush's Trust, 81 N .. W.2d 615 (Minn. 1957); and 
Figures v. Sherrell, 178 S.W .. 2d 629 (Tenn. 1944)1 
In 1965 the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was repealed and 
replaced with the Uniform Commercial Code, Investment Securities 
Act, §70A-8-101, et seq. 
Section 70A-8-309 retains the requirement of actual 
delivery of the certificate to pass title. This section states: 
An endorsement of a security whether special 
or in blank does not constitute a transfer 
until delivery of the security on which 
it appears or if the endorsement is on a 
separate document until delivery of both 
the document and the security. 
The Commissioners of the Uniform Commercial Code made the 
following comment as to Section 8-309: 
There must be a voluntary parting with 
control in order to affect a valid 
transfer of an investment security as 
between the parties. 
One court has interpreted this provision to hold that 
even if it was the intention of the president of a company to 
give certain shares to his children, the mere endorsement on 
the certificates and transfer in the corporate books were 
insufficient to constitute a gift when the shares were never Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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delivered before the president's death. Whitfield v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company, 262 F .. Supp. 977 (DA Ark., 
1967)" 
The preceding review of Utah judicial and statutory law 
clearly shows that transfer of stocks can only be accomplished 
by delivery of the stock certificates and that any entries 
made in the corporate books are deemed to be for the benefit 
of the corporation only and do not constitute a transfer as 
between the transferor and the transferee., 
With these principles in mind, it only remains to again 
examine the decision of the lower court in light of the correct 
principles of law which should have been applied. 
G.. FINDINGS OF THE COURT REGARDING DELIVERY COMPARED 
TO PROPER APPLICABLE LAW., 
As previously noted, the trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision found delivery of stock had occurred because an actual 
transfer of the stock had been made on the corporate books., 
The court stated that had the certificates of stock become 
lost then the only source of information as to ownership 
would have been the corporate stock transfer records and "by 
entry on these records a clear and unmistakable intention for 
immediate ownership transfer is recordede" The court also 
stated, "The stock record books give a basis for determina-
tion of voting power, dividend recipients, and persons to whom 
corporate information such as proxy, notice of meetings, 
etc., must be furnished and are the most clear and convincing 
evidence as to the actual owners of a corporation." (R .. , 
p. 106). 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The transfer of corporate records mentioned in the 
Memorandum Decision was also listed as one of the three 
reasons justifying the conclusion of delivery in the 
court's Conclusions of Law. (R., pp. 119-120). The 
reliance by the trial court on the transfer of corporate 
records is clearly erroneous. As can be seen supra, the 
overwhelming weight of authority in the United States and 
in Utah requires actual delivery of the stock certificate 
and not the mere change of ownership in the corporate books. 
In the instant case, this reason is even more compelling 
since the decedent himself was the stock transfer agent of 
each of the corporations and could have easily changed the 
corporate books to reflect his change of mind in giving Rod 
any of the stock in the various companies. 
The trial court was ·even mistaken as to the effect that 
a lost stock certificate may have in determining ownership. 
When a stock certificate is lost and there is a dispute as to 
ownership, the claimant must not only show that the original 
certificate has been stolen or lost but also must show that 
he is the rightful owner of the stock as determined by the 
rules relating to stock ownership. 18 C.J.S., Corporations, 
Section 266, page 738. Therefore, it would still be required 
under Utah law for respondent to prove that actual delivery 
of the certificate had occurred before he could obtain a 
replacement for a lost or stolen certificate. Contrary to the 
trial court's assertion, the corporate books do not establish 
this ownership. 
In addition to the transfer on the corporate books and 
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records, the court relied on two other factors in determining 
a delivery had been made. First, "by the placing of each of 
the shares in a properly identified envelope to be kept with 
and maintained with the certificates belonging to each of the 
members of the Ross family;" and second, 1'1:he complete lack 
of any effort by the decedent to revoke, to set conditions on 
or otherwise exercise any prerequisite of ownership of any of 
the shares in question" (Ro, pp. 119-120) e These reasons 
also fail to justify a finding of delivery. 
While it is no doubt true that the decedent was the 
custodian of the stock certificates for the entire family, 
this fact does not assist the Respondent in attempting to show 
a valid delivery. A donor cannot deliver property to himself 
and then claim that he is a constructive trustee as he could 
if the property were delivered to a third party in which an 
irrevocable delivery could be determinedo 
It is undisputed that Respondent Rod Ross had no access 
to either the First Security safety deposit box or the company 
safe. On the other hand, the decedent had access to both and 
could put in or take out documents at his pleasure. Had a 
valid delivery been made to Respondent he could no doubt 
choose to place the certificates along with the other family 
certificates in the custody of the decedent~ However, since 
no delivery was ever made to Respondent in which he gained 
complete control over the certificates and in which the decedent 
gave up complete dominion over the certificates, the presence 
of the other family stock certificates in the safe is of no 
assistance to Respondent's contentions. 
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Finally, the fact that the decedent had not yet revoked 
or set any conditions of ownership does not constitute delivery. 
The question is not whether the decedent revoked the power of 
ownership but whether he had the ability to revoke such power. 
Obviously, if he had such ability no "irrevocable" delivery 
had been made. 
The fact that the Respondent received a cash dividend 
is also not germane since the decedent could choose to allow 
Respondent to have the income from the stock without giving 
him the actual ownership. Likewise, the fact of a stock 
dividend is also immaterial since the stock was never delivered 
to the Respondent but was kept by the decedent with the other 
stock. Cash dividends and stock dividends in themselves do 
not constitute proof of delivery. In Re Bush's Trust, 81 
N.W. 2d 615 (Minn. 1957}. 
In this case the parties are the children of the decedent. 
A 9ift to family members is especially suspect and a strict 
enforcement of the rules requiring delivery is required and 
the donor must go as far as the nature of the property and the 
circumstances reasonably permit in parting with dominion and 
making the gift irrevocable in cases involving family members. 
In Re Brown's Estate, 206 P.2d 816 (Mont. 1948). 
The avoid these types of disputes actual manual delivery 
of the property should be accomplished when delivery is 
physically possible. Will v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
82 F. 2d 561 (5th Cir. 194 O} . Here, Respondent Rod Ross admitted 
that he saw his father on a daily basis and that it would have beei 
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an easy thing for his father to give him the certificates and 
to make actual deliveryo (Tr .. , p.. 2 7 4) o 
The trial court clearly erred in concluding that a 
valid delivery of the stock had occurredo Without delivery 
therecan be no gift and it was the burden of Respondent to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that such a -delivery had 
in fact occurred. This case is analogous to this Court's 
recent decision of Wiggill Vo Cheney, 597 Po2d 1351 (Utah 
1979), in which the Court sustained a finding that no valid 
gift had occurred because of the failure to deliver a deed 
to real property. This Court concluded by stating: 
The evidence presented in the present 
case establishes Lillian Cheney remained 
in sole possession and control of the 
deed in question until her death. Because 
no actual delivery of the deed occurred 
prior to the death of the grantor, the 
subsequent manual delivery of the deed 
by plaintiff to defendant conveyed no 
title to the property described 
therein, or any part thereof, or any 
of its contents. Ide at 1352. 
The same situation exists in the present case and the 
stock purportedly transferred to Respondent Rod Ross should 
be deemed, as a matter of law, a part of the entire estate 
to be divided equally among the three heirs in accordance 
with the terms of the will. 
CONCLUSION 
Before Rod Ross can prevail in his claim as to the stock 
now in dispute, it is necessary for him to prove ~elements 
required for a valid inter vivos transfero 
The evidence as found by the trial court and viewed 
mostly favorably to Rod clearly shows that the decedent failed 
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to deliver the stock prior to his death~ The trial court's 
conclusion to the contrary is directly against Utah law of 
stock transfer and cannot be sustained. 
Because of the failure of Respondent to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence the delivery of the stock, this Court 
must reverse the judgment of the lower court and order that 
the disputed stock be included in the decedent's estate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAX WHEELER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
David E. Ross II and Betsy Ross Rapp 
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